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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze employment and capital adjustments using a panel
of plants from Colombia. We allow for nonlinear adjustment of employment
to reﬂect not only adjustment costs of labor but also adjustment costs of capi-
tal, and vice-versa. Using data from the Annual Manufacturing Survey, which
include plant-level prices, we generate measures of plant-level productivity, de-
mand shocks, and cost shocks, and use them to measure desired factor levels.
We then estimate adjustment functions for capital and labor as a function of
the gap between desired and actual factor levels. As in other countries, we
ﬁnd non-linear adjustments in employment and capital in response to market
fundamentals. In addition, we ﬁnd that employment and capital adjustments
reinforce each other, in that capital shortages reduce hiring and labor shortages
reduce investment. Moreover, we ﬁnd that the market oriented reforms intro-
duced in Colombia after 1990 increased employment adjustments, especially on
the job destruction margin, while reducing capital adjustments. Finally, we
ﬁnd that while completely eliminating frictions from factor adjustments would
yield a dramatic increase in aggregate productivity through improved allocative
eﬃciency, the reforms introduced in Colombia generated only modest improve-
ments.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Well-functioning market economies require that producers be able to change their
input mix in response to shocks. Yet, for the main factors of production, namely
capital and labor, there is limited scope for continual adjustment. There is evidence
that, at the level of production units, changes in investment and employment are
associated with substantial restructuring rather than frequent tinkering. Lumpy
adjustment of both capital and labor at the plant-level is a stylized fact in studies for
the U.S. and other countries (e.g., Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1995, 1997),
Cooper, Haltiwanger and Power (1999), Doms and Dunne (1998), Gelos and Isgut
(2001), and Nilsen and Schiantarelli (2003)). One explanation behind these ﬁndings
is that ﬁxed adjustment costs and irreversibilities make changes in factor demands less
frequent and more substantial. However, to date, among the few studies that have
analyzed joint adjustments of capital and labor, most examine this interaction using
sectoral level data and convex adjustment cost models (Nadiri and Rosen (1969),
Shapiro (1986), Rossana (1990), and Hall (2004)).1
In this paper, we study the evolution of the joint adjustment of employment
growth and investment using panel data from Colombian manufacturing plants. In
contrast to most previous studies using micro data, our framework allows for in-
teractions between the adjustments of capital and labor. Factor demands may be
inter-related so that frictions for one factor may generate lumpy adjustment not only
for that particular factor but also for other factors of production. Moreover, an
interesting question in the context of developing and transition economies is whether
the recent wave of market reforms have changed the nature of the adjustment process
for manufacturers. Thus, in this paper, we also focus on how inter-related labor and
capital adjustments changed after factor markets were deregulated in Colombia in
the early 1990s.
Colombia is an interesting case to consider these issues. First, Colombia under-
took substantial market reforms during the early 1990s, which were in part intended
to liberalize labor and ﬁnancial markets, and to facilitate factor adjustments. For
example, in 1990 and 1991, the reforms reduced dismissal costs; liberalized deposit
rates; eliminated credit subsidies; modernized capital market and banking legislation;
removed restrictions on inﬂows of foreign direct investment, and greatly reduced bar-
riers to imports. Second, Colombia has unique longitudinal microeconomic data
1A recent paper by Polder et. al. (2004) investigates the connection between capital and labor
adjustment dynamics using micro data for Denmark. This study permits nonlinear adjustment for
capital to spillover to the adjustment for labor, where the latter is assumed to be subject to convex
adjustment costs. Unlike our analysis which relies on a generalized (S,s) adjustment function
approach developed by Caballero and Engel (1999), Polder et al. (2004) use regime switching
techniques proposed by Barnett and Sakellaris (1998). Moreover, contrary to our results, Polder et
al. (2004) ﬁnd limited inﬂuence of spillovers from nonlinear capital adjustment to labor. The reason
is that their estimates of labor adjustment costs are extremely high (in their view, even implausibly
high), leaving very little room for interaction.
2on businesses. The main distinguishing feature of these data is that they have in-
formation on both plant-level quantities and prices, which permits us to separately
measure productivity and demand shocks and to examine the impact of these shocks
on factor adjustments. This is an innovation with respect to most of the existing
literature, which measures productivity as the residual from a production function
where physical output is proxied by revenue divided by a common industry-level de-
ﬂator. The traditional productivity measures thus confound productivity diﬀerences
across plants with within-industry price diﬀerences across plants. If prices reﬂect
idiosyncratic demand shifts or market power variation rather than quality or other
diﬀerences in product attributes, then productivity shocks as traditionally measured
may not be related to technology or eﬃciency at all. By contrast, our physical output
measures deﬂate revenue by plant-level prices so that we can separate productivity
and price eﬀects.
Our paper makes a number of methodological innovations. First, we analyze
inter-related factor demands at the micro level in the presence of nonlinear adjustment
functions. This allows us not only to characterize the potential nonlinearities in the
adjustment of labor relative to capital at the micro level, but also to identify whether
there are dynamic complementarities across factors. Second, we use production and
d e m a n df u n c t i o n se s t i m a t e du s i n go u rr i c hm i c r od a t at oi d e n t i f yk e yp a r a m e t e r s
a sw e l la sp r o d u c t i v i t ya n dd e m a n ds h o c k s ,w h i c ha r eu s e da l o n gw i t hi n p u tp r i c e
shocks to estimate desired factor demands. This allows us to examine how the
gaps between the actual and desired adjustments of capital and labor depend on
productivity, demand and cost shocks. One strength of our analysis is that we
measure the desired factor levels by estimating directly the expressions resulting
from the frictionless maximization problem. In particular, given data availability
and our estimation method, in order to measure factor gaps, we do not have to resort
to inference about the relationships between neither employment and hours nor ﬁxed
capital and energy utilization.
We ﬁnd strong evidence of nonlinear micro adjustment, as businesses are much
more likely to adjust capital and labor (ora d j u s tb yag r e a t e ra m o u n t )i ft h eg a p s
between desired and actual levels are large. In addition, we ﬁnd that capital and
labor adjustments tend to reinforce each other in that bigger capital shortages reduce
hiring and bigger labor shortages reduce investment, and vice-versa. Moreover, we
ﬁnd strong evidence that the reforms led to more ﬂexible labor adjustment, especially
on the job destruction side, while reducing capital adjustments. Even though fric-
tions were reduced in both labor and ﬁnancial markets, it seems that the impact was
much larger on labor adjustment costs, which would have led producers to increase
adjustment of labor and decrease adjustment of the more ﬁxed capital input. Finally,
we explore how the changes in factor adjustments aﬀected allocative eﬃciency. We
ﬁnd that the reduction in factor market frictions following the reforms had a positive
b u tm o d e s ti m p a c to na l l o c a t i v ee ﬃciency. On the other hand, we ﬁnd that if ad-
justment frictions could be completely eliminated there would be a dramatic increase
3in productivity.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe the institutional changes
that led to factor market deregulation in Colombia. In Section 3, we set up the
building blocks to estimate labor and capital adjustments under nonconvex adjust-
ment costs. In Section 4, we describe the basic data and present our estimates of
productivity and demand shocks, which are then used to estimate the distributions
of capital and labor shortages. In Section 5, we present evidence on the extent of
heterogeneity and nonlinearities in factor adjustments in Colombia, and on the evo-
lution of these adjustments after the Colombian factor market reforms of 1991. In
Section 6, we present decompositions of aggregate productivity which allow us to ex-
amine the impact of removing frictions in factor markets on productivity enhancing
reallocation. We conclude in Section 7.
2 Factor Market Deregulation in Colombia
In the early 1990s, the government of President Cesar Gaviria introduced important
reforms to eliminate rigidities and enhance ﬂexibility in factor markets.
Law 50 of December 1990 introduced severance payments savings accounts and
reduced dismissal costs by between 60% and 80% (see, e.g., Kugler (1999, 2004)). In
1993, Law 100 changed the social security system by allowing voluntary transfers from
a pay-as-you-go system to a fully-funded system with individual accounts, though this
law also introduced a mandatory hike in employer and employee contributions up to
13.5% of salaries, of which 75% was paid by employers (see, e.g., Kugler and Kugler
(2003)).
Other reforms sought to reduce frictions in ﬁnancial markets. In 1990, Law 45
eliminated interest rate ceilings as well as requirements to invest in government secu-
rities, and lowered reserve requirements. At the same time, supervision of ﬁnancial
markets was reinforced in line with the Basle Accords for capitalization requirements.
Law 9 of 1991 established the abolition of exchange controls eliminating the monopoly
of the central bank on foreign exchange transactions and lowering substantially the
extent of capital controls. Finally, Resolution 49 of 1991 eliminated restrictions to
foreign direct investment. This resolution established national treatment of foreign
enterprises and eliminated limits on the transfer of proﬁts abroad as well as bureau-
cratic procedures requiring the approval of individual projects by foreign ﬁrms (see,
e.g., Kugler (2005)). This measure facilitated capital inﬂo w sa c r o s sa l ls e c t o r s ,b u t
also induced entry of foreign banks increasing competition and lowering intermedia-
tion costs in the ﬁnancial sector.
At the same time, international trade was largely liberalized. The gradual de-
crease in tariﬀs initiated by the preceding Barco government, between 1986 and 1990,
was accelerated by Gaviria. By the end of 1991, 99.9% of items were in the free im-
port regime, nominal protection reached 14.4%, and eﬀective protection 26.6%, down
from 62.5% a year earlier (Edwards (2001)).
4If the goal of the reforms of enhancing allocative eﬃciency was achieved, its success
should be reﬂe c t e di nd i ﬀerent patterns of factor adjustment dynamics between the
1980s and the 1990s, with increased ﬂexibility of employment and capital adjustments
after the reforms. In what follows, we consider the dynamics of factor adjustment be-
fore and after the reforms (pre- and post-1990), allowing for interdependence between
employment growth and investment.
3 Theoretical Framework
This section explains the methodology we use to estimate adjustment hazards, as a
function of the gaps between actual and desired levels of labor and capital, in the
presence of either convex or nonconvex adjustment costs. In turn, we propose a
framework for deriving the desired factor demands, which are needed to estimate
factor gaps.
3.1 Inter-related Adjustment Costs
Following Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1995, 1997) (CEH hereafter), our the-
oretical framework is based on the observation that employment and capital are
unlikely to equal their desired levels when they are subject to adjustment costs. In
the presence of costs of adjusting employment and capital, thus, plant j will face em-
ployment and capital shortages, Zjt and Xjt at time t. We measure the employment
shortage by
Zjt =
L∗
jt − Ljt−1
1
2
³
L∗
jt + Ljt−1
´, (1)
where L∗
jt is the desired level of employment, or the employment level if adjustment
costs are momentarily removed, and Ljt−1 is meant to capture employment after the
shocks but before the plant has adjusted employment.2 Zjt is naturally bounded
between -2 and 2. Similarly, we measure the capital shortage by,
Xjt =
K∗
jt − Kjt−1
1
2
³
K∗
jt + Kjt−1
´, (2)
where K∗
jt is the desired level of capital, or the level of capital if adjustment costs
are momentarily removed, and Kjt−1 captures capital after the shocks but before the
2The adjustment measures we use are analogous to those developed and used by Davis, Halti-
wanger and Schuh (1996) to study plant-level employment dynamics. The diﬀerence between two
variables a and b divided by the average of a and b is a second-order approximation to the log ﬁrst
diﬀerence between a and b. An advantage of the Davis-Haltiwanger-Schuh measures is that they are
symmetric and bounded, which reduces the potential for large outliers driving the results. Results
are very similar if we use log ﬁrst diﬀerences (not surprisingly, given the second-order approxima-
tion).
5plant has adjusted the capital stock. We deﬁne adjustment functions for employment
and capital, Ajt(Zjt,X jt)a n dBjt(Zjt,X jt), as the fraction of the respective shortage
that is actually adjusted, and model them as a function of Zjt and Xjt.T h a t i s ,
deﬁning the actual adjustments of employment and capital as:
4ljt =
Ljt − Ljt−1
1
2 (Ljt + Ljt−1)
(3)
and
4kjt =
Kjt − Kjt−1
1
2 (Kjt + Kjt−1)
, (4)
the adjustment functions Ajt(Zjt,X jt)a n dBjt(Zjt,X jt), which are also sometimes
called “adjustment hazards” in the literature, are given by
Ajt(Zjt,X jt)=
4ljt
Zjt
and
Bjt(Zjt,X jt)=
4kjt
Xjt
.
The adjustment functions of employment and capital tell us something about
the nature of adjustment costs. In particular, an employment adjustment function
independent of the capital shortage, Z, and a capital adjustment function independent
of the labor shortage, X, are consistent with quadratic adjustment costs or a partial
adjustment model. By contrast, employment and capital adjustment functions that
depend on Z and X, respectively, would be consistent with linear or lumpy adjustment
costs or non-convexities.3 For instance, in the presence of ﬁxed costs of adjustment,
producers postpone adjustment until they are faced with large enough input shortages
or surpluses. Our contribution is to allow the employment adjustment function to
depend on the capital gap, X, and the capital adjustment function to depend on the
labor gap, Z, which would reveal non-convex dynamic interactions between capital
and labor. Adjustment functions can be estimated either non-parametrically or
parametrically as in Caballero and Engel (1993, 1999). Here we start with the
following parametric speciﬁcation:
Ajt(Zjt,X jt)=λ0 + λ1Z
2
jt + λ2Zjt × Xjt + λ3X
2
jt,
Bjt(Zjt,X jt)=κ0 + κ1X
2
jt + κ2Zjt × Xjt + κ3X
2
jt.
We modify this speciﬁcation to permit the impact of Z on employment changes
and X on capital changes to depend on the sign of Z and X (i.e., shortages and
3Caballero and Engel (1993,1999) develop the generalized (S,s) approach formally showing that
models of nonconvexities imply a richer nonlinear relationship between adjustment and economic
fundamentals as captured by the gap between desired and actual stocks.
6surpluses). We also permit the adjustment functions to vary across the pre- and post-
reform period. Since the hazards Ajt(Zjt,X jt)a n dBjt(Zjt,X jt)a r ep o o r l yd e ﬁned
in the neighborhood of Zit =0a n dXjt =0 ,w er e - w r i t et h ea d j u s t m e n tf u n c t i o n
deﬁnitions and estimate the following equations at the micro-level with plant-level
eﬀects:
4ljt(Zjt,X jt)=ZjtAjt(Zjt,X jt)=Zjt[λ0 + λ1Z
2
jt + λ2Zjt × Xjt + λ3X
2
jt], (5)
4kjt(Zjt,X jt)=XjtBjt(Zjt,X jt)=Xjt[κ0 + κ1X
2
jt + κ2Zjt × Xjt + κ3X
2
jt]. (6)
In order to estimate the cross-section distribution of shortages and the adjustment
functions, we ﬁrst need to determine the desired levels of employment and capital.
Given certain conditions, these can be proxied, up to a plant-speciﬁc constant, by
the frictionless levels of employment and capital, where the frictionless levels are the
levels that would be chosen absent any adjustment costs.4 In particular, the desired
and frictionless levels relate to each other as follows:
L
∗
jt = LjtθLj,
K
∗
jt = KjtθKj,
where Ljt and Kjt are the frictionless demands of employment and capital, and θLj
and θKj are the plant-speciﬁc employment and capital constants (which may also
capture measurement error). The frictionless levels of employment and capital will
be determined below by the ﬁrst-order conditions of the plants’ static optimization
problem. Following CEH (1995, 1997), θLj and θKj can be determined as the ra-
tio between actual and frictionless employment and the ratio between actual and
frictionless capital stock for the plants’ median employment growth and investment,
respectively, where median employment growth and investment are interpreted as
reﬂecting replacement employment changes and investment. In other words, it is as-
sumed that, in the year of a plant’s median employment growth (investment), desired
and actual adjustment of labor (capital) are equal.5
4CEH (1995) and Bertola and Caballero (1994) discuss the conditions under which this adjust-
ment is a reasonable approximation.
5It is useful to discuss potential limitations about our approach. Cooper and Willis (2003) raise
questions about the use of measures of the gap between desired and actual factors to make structural
inferences about the presence and magnitude of nonconvexities. Even though, like CEH, we interpret
adjustment functions that increase in the magnitude of the shortages as evidence consistent with
nonconvexities, we can remain agnostic on the structural interpretation of the adjustment functions.
First, our results use a semi-reduced form speciﬁcation allowing actual factor adjustment to be a
nonlinear function of fundamentals (TFP and demand shocks). In this sense, were are not subject
to the criticisms originally raised by Cooper and Willis (2003), since they are concerned in part with
the approximations of shortages made by CEH (1997) given data limitations. In addition, it is
worth noting that our main point here is that the adjustment frictions changed in systematic ways
in response to factor market reforms.
7One point to note in our approach is that although we do not specify the underly-
ing structural adjustment costs but rather estimate semi-structural adjustment cost
functions we are assuming that the underlying structural adjustment costs are exter-
nal rather than internal (as deﬁned by Lucas (1967) and Treadway (1969)). That
is, the adjustment costs are separable costs in the proﬁt maximization so that the
production function depends on the levels of the inputs and not on the changes in
the inputs. This approach permits us to both conceptually measure and estimate
the desired levels of labor and capital using a standard Cobb-Douglas production
function. While, like ours, most papers in the literature assume external adjustment
costs, some progress has been made in the recent literature in terms of exploring the
role of internal adjustment costs (e.g., Cooper and Haltiwanger (2005) and Cooper,
Haltiwanger and Willis (2005)).
3.2 Frictionless Proﬁt Maximization
Both to determine the frictionless levels of employment and capital and to determine
the plant-speciﬁc constants, we need to specify the plants’ optimization problem and
obtain the ﬁrst-order conditions. The plant’s production function is:
Yjt = K
α
jt(LjtHjt)
β E
γ
jtM
φ
jtVjt, (7)
where Kjt is capital, Ljt is employment, Hjt are hours per worker, Ejt is energy use,
Mjt are materials, and Vjt is a productivity shock.
There is an inverse demand for the product given by:
Pjt = Y
− 1
η
jt Djt, (8)
where Pjt is the output price and Djt is a demand shock and where −1
η is the inverse
of the elasticity of demand.
Finally, the ﬁrm faces competitive factor markets, where total labor costs, capital
costs, energy costs and materials costs are:
ωL (Ljt,H jt)=w0tLjt
³
1+w1tH
δ
jt
´
ωK (Kjt)=RtKjt,
ωE (Ejt)=PEtEjt,
ωM (Mjt)=PMtMjt,
The wage function depends on the straight-time wage, w0t,a sw e l la so nt h eo v e r t i m e
premium w1t.T h e ﬁrm takes the user cost of capital, Rt, and energy and material
prices, PEt and PMt,a sg i v e n .
The state variables are the capital stock, the level of employment, hours, energy
consumption, and materials that the plant would choose in the absence of frictions
(the frictionless factor demands). These are equivalent to the observed levels for
8inputs not subject to adjustment costs. We assume here that materials, energy and
hours per worker all fall within this category, while we allow adjustment costs for
capital and labor.
The ﬁrm maximizes frictionless proﬁts by choosing capital, employment, hours,
energy consumption, and materials, ignoring adjustment costs. The solution to the
system of ﬁrst-order conditions is given by two equations:6
e Ljt =
(
η
η−1)[ln(
η
η−1)−e Djt]−e Vjt−βe Hjt−γe Ejt−φe Mjt+(
η
η−1−α)
h
e w0t+ln(1+w1tH
δ
jt)−lnβ
i
−αlnα+αe Rt
[α+β−(
η
η−1)] ,
f Kjt =
(
η
η−1)[ln(
η
η−1)−e Djt]−e Vjt−βe Hjt−γe Ejt−φe Mjt+(
η
η−1−β)[e Rt−lnα]−β lnβ+β
h
e w0t+ln(1+w1tH
δ
jt)
i
[α+β−(
η
η−1)] ,
(9)
where e y denotes the natural logarithm of variable y.
Frictionless levels in equation (9) are estimated numerically by substituting the
various parameters of the model, calculated as explained below. Then, taking the
exponential of the logarithms of frictionless employment and capital, we obtain de-
sired employment and capital. Finally, we use these to calculate our employment and
capital shortages, Zjt and Xjt, and in turn to estimate the adjustment functions.
3.3 Estimation
The system of equations above can be estimated numerically by obtaining the pa-
rameters, α, β, γ, φ, η,a n dδ as well as the productivity and demand shocks, e Vjt
and f Djt, and input prices, e Rt, e w0t, and e w1t.T h e v a l u e s o f , α, β, γ, φ, η, e Vjt and
f Djt, are obtained, as described in Section 4, from estimating the output production
function and the inverse-demand function. For the user cost of capital, e Rt,t h er e -
sults we report use a constant value, 0.15, which is in the lower bound of previous
estimates for Colombia. The straight-time wage, e w0t, are the earnings estimated as
e x p l a i n e di nS e c t i o n4a n dt h eo v e r t i m ep r e m i u m , e w1t, is set to the legally required
overtime premium of 25% in Colombia. Materials, energy and hours are measured
as explained in Section 4. The only missing parameter is δ. Both Bils (1987) and
Cooper and Willis (2003) estimate a δ of 2 for the U.S. We use this parameter as
an approximation.7
6See the Appendix for the full derivation of the ﬁrst-order conditions.
7We tried diﬀerent values of δ, ranging from δ =1t oδ = 5. Results are robust to these changes.
We have also tried other estimates of e Rt, both constant and variable, which yield similar results.
94 Data Description
Our data come from the Colombian Annual Manufacturers Survey (AMS) for the
years 1982 to 1998.8 The AMS is an unbalanced panel of Colombian plants with
more than 10 employees, or sales above a certain limit (around US$35,000 in 1998).9
The AMS includes information for each plant on: value of output and average prices
charged for each product manufactured (products are reported at the 8-digit ISIC
level); overall cost and average prices paid for each material used in the production
process; energy consumption in physical units and average energy prices; production
and non-production number of workers and payroll; and book values of equipment
and structures. The database also provides information on plant location (state) as
well as industry classiﬁcation codes (at the 5-digit ISIC level).
To implement the methodology explained above, we need measures of productivity
and demand shocks as well as factor use at the plant level. We estimate total factor
productivity (TFP) for each plant using a capital-labor-materials-energy (KLEM)
production function and demand shocks for each plant using a standard inverse-
demand function. Therefore, we need to construct physical quantities and prices of
output and inputs, capital stock series, and total labor hours. The construction of
these variables and productivity and demand shocks is explained below. A more
thorough description of the measurement of each variable can be found in Eslava,
Haltiwanger, Kugler and Kugler (2004).
4.1 Plant-level Prices and Quantities
With the rich information on prices collected in the AMS, we can construct plant-
level price indices for output and materials. This represents an enormous advantage
with respect to other sources of data, as the use of more aggregate price deﬂators is
a common source of measurement error due to plant-speciﬁc demand shocks. Plant-
level price changes of output (and materials) are constructed as weighted averages
of the price changes of all products generated (materials used) by the plant. The
weights correspond to the average shares of the diﬀerent products (materials) in the
total value of production (materials used) for the period over which the change is
calculated. Plant-level price indices are then generated recursively from these price
changes.10
8The annual data we use are very rich with plant-level measures of outputs, inputs, and output
and input prices. One limitation in the current context is that the data are annual and so we
are subject to time aggregation issues (see, e.g., Hammermesh (1993) and Hammermesh and Pfann
(1996) for an excellent discussion of time aggregation). Since we take a ﬂexible functional form
to our adjustment functions and do not attempt to identify the underlying structure of adjustment
costs, this mitigates the concerns about time aggregation.
9The methodology used to establish longitudinal linkages to follow plants over time is described
in detail in the Appendix to Eslava et al. (2004).
10Given the recursive method used to construct the price indices and the fact that we do not have
plant-level information for product and material prices for the years before plants enter the sample,
10Given prices for materials and output, the quantities of materials and output are
constructed by dividing the cost of materials and value of output by the corresponding
prices. Quantities of energy consumption are directly reported by the plant. In
addition, we need capital stocks to estimate a KLEM production function.
The plant capital stock (which includes equipment and buildings) is constructed
recursively using a perpetual inventory method:
Kjt =( 1− κ)Kjt−1 +
Ijt
PIt
for all t such that Kjt−1 > 0, where Ijt is gross investment, κ is the depreciation rate
and PIt is a deﬂator for gross capital formation. For each plant, we initialize the
series at the book value reported in the ﬁr s ty e a rt h ep l a n ta p p e a r si nt h es a m p l e .
Our measure of PIt is the implicit deﬂator for capital formation from the input-output
matrices for years 1982-1994, and from the output utilization matrices for later years.
We use the depreciation rates calculated by Pombo (1999) at the 3-digit sectoral
level, which range between 8.7% and 17.7% for machinery and between 2.4% and
9.8% for buildings. Gross investment is generated from the information on ﬁxed
assets reported by each plant and can be positive or negative.
Finally, since the AMS does not have data on hours per worker (only employment),
we construct a measure of hours per worker at time t for sector G(j), to which plant
j belongs, as,
Hjt =
earningsG(j)t
wG(j)t
,
where wG(j)t is a measure of sectoral wages at the 3-digit level from the Monthly Man-
ufacturing Survey, and earningsG(j)t is a measure of earnings per worker constructed
using the AMS data, where
earningsG(j)t =
P
j∈G
payrolljt
P
j∈G
Ljt
.
A sector-level nominal wage for year t and sector G is constructed as the weighted
average of the wages of non-production and production workers, where the weights
are respectively the share of administrative employees and the share of production
employees in the total number of employees in year t for the average plant in sector
G. Finally, wG(j)t is equal to the real wage, which is this nominal wage deﬂated using
the CPI.11
we impute initial product and material prices for each plant with missing values by using the average
prices in their sector, location, and year. When the information is not available by location, we
impute the national average in the sector for that year.
11By using a sectoral wage index, we are attributing plant-speciﬁcd i ﬀerences in wages from the
sectoral average to diﬀerences in labor quality at the plant.
114.2 Descriptive Statistics of Prices and Quantities
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the quantity and price variables just de-
scribed, for the pre- and post-reform periods. The quantity variables are expressed in
logs, while the prices are relative to a yearly producer price index to discount inﬂation.
Output increased between the pre- and post-reform periods. In addition, the table
shows that capital, materials and energy use increased, but employment decreased
between the pre- and post-reform periods. Relative prices of output and materials
prices declined between the pre- and post-reform periods, while energy prices and
wages increased.12 Below, we use these variables to estimate the production function
and inverse-demand equation.
4.3 Productivity Shock Estimation
We estimate total factor productivity for each establishment as the residual from the
capital-labor-energy-materials (KLEM) production function, equation (7), which we
estimate in logs:
TFP jt =l o gYjt − b αlogKjt − b β(logLjt +l o gHjt) − b γ logEjt − b φlogMjt. (10)
where b α, b β, b γ,a n db φ are the estimated factor elasticities for capital, labor hours,
energy, and materials. Since productivity shocks are likely to be correlated with
inputs, OLS estimates of factor elasticities are likely to be biased. We thus present
IV estimates, where we use demand-shift instruments which are correlated with in-
put use but uncorrelated with productivity shocks. As described in Eslava et al.
(2004), we construct Shea (1993) and Syverson (2003) type instruments by selecting
industries whose output ﬂuctuations are likely to function as approximately exoge-
nous demand shocks for other industries. In addition, we use as instruments one- and
two-period lags of the demand shifters just described, energy and materials prices,
and government expenditures (excluding investment) in the region where the plant
is located.13
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 present the OLS and IV results from the estimation
of the KLEM speciﬁcation. IV results show larger capital and energy elasticities, but
12Caution needs to be used in interpreting mean relative prices in this context since the relative
price at the micro level is the log diﬀerence between the plant-level price and the log of the aggregate
PPI. On an appropriately output weighted basis, the mean of this relative price measure should
be close to zero in all periods since the PPI is dominated by manufacturing industries. The larger
diﬀerence with respect to PPI in the post-reform period reﬂects that the growth of manufacturing
prices fell more rapidly than that of other prices in the economy, possibly due to the fact that
external competition introduced by the reforms aﬀected the manufacturing sector more than others.
13Sargan tests indicate that these are valid instruments, including energy and materials prices
which are unlikely to be aﬀected by buyers’ market power in the Colombian context. See Eslava et
al. (2004) for further details on the instruments.
12lower employment hours and materials elasticities relative to the OLS elasticities.14
As a check of instrument relevance, the last column of Table 2 reports partial R20s
for the ﬁrst-stages of the inputs on the various instruments, which show that the
instruments can explain a substantial fraction of the variation in input use.15
One potential limitation of our approach is that we have imposed the same factor
elasticities for all plants in the manufacturing sector. We make this assumption as
our IV approach mainly exploits between industry diﬀerences in downstream demand
factors. As a robustness check, we have also estimated factor elasticities at the 3-
digit industry level using the standard cost share approach (where the shares are
estimated out of total revenue in the sector) and assuming constant returns to scale
so that the capital share can be measured as a residual. When we use these alternative
factor elasticities with the plant-level data we obtain an alternative measure of TFP.
The correlation of this alternative with our preferred IV measure is very high, 0.88.
Moreover, the standard deviation of the two TFP measures are about the same and
the correlations of the cost share based TFP with other key variables (e.g., plant-
level prices) are very similar to those with our instrumented TFP measure. In other
words, our TFP measure has properties that are robust with respect to reasonable
alternative methods for estimating TFP, including allowing for sectoral diﬀerences in
factor elasticities. As a consequence, we have found that the results in this paper are
largely robust to using these alternative TFP measure and factor elasticities.
4.4 Demand Shock Estimation
We estimate establishment-level demand shocks as the residual of the (log) inverse-
demand equation (8):
djt =l o gd Djt =l o gPjt + b εlogYjt, (11)
where ε is the inverse of the elasticity of demand, η.16
14The correlation between our TFP measure (estimated with constant factor elasticities) and a
TFP measure estimated allowing elasticities that vary pre- and post-reform periods is 0.9. Results
should therefore not change importantly using one or the other TFP measure. Also, note that
it is diﬃcult to allow factor elasticities to vary by sector in our context, since our demand-shift
instruments vary mainly by sector. However, as discussed below, we have estimated an alternative
TFP measure which allows factor elastiticites to vary by sector and this is highly correlated with
our preferred measure.
15Given multiple endogenous regressors, the ﬁrst-stage partial R2 suggested by Shea (1997) is more
appropriate than standard ﬁrst-stage R20s. The partial R2 measures the correlation between an
endogenous regressor and the instruments after taking away the correlation between that particular
regressor with all other endogenous regressors.
16While we call the residual from this inverse-demand regression a demand shock, it is possible
that this residual captures relative price shocks due to diﬀerences in market power or diﬀerences in
product quality across plants. To the extent that this residual captures product quality diﬀerences,
we would be allowing desired employment and capital levels to be aﬀected by productivity diﬀerences
in terms of quality as well as quantity. However, it is worth noting that our ﬁndings of (i) an
13Table 3 reports the results of the inverse-demand equations using both OLS and
IV estimation.17 The OLS results in Column (1) suggest a large elasticity of -11.05.
However, using OLS to estimate the inverse-demand function is likely to generate
an upwardly biased estimate of the demand elasticity because demand shocks are
positively correlated to both output and prices. To eliminate the upward bias in our
estimates, we use TFP as an instrument for Yjt since TFP is positively correlated
with output (by construction) but unlikely to be correlated with demand shocks.
The 2SLS results indeed show a much lower elasticity of -2.28. We report results
keeping the elasticity of demand constant across sectors. However, all of our results
are robust to allowing demand elasticities to vary by 3-digit sector.
5 Labor and Capital Adjustments
We now turn to examining the overall patterns of capital and labor adjustments
as well as adjustments during the pre- and post-reform periods. Before turning
to the estimates of adjustment functions, Table 4 presents the ﬁrst moments of the
distributions of labor and capital shortages before and after the reforms for the sample
of pairwise continuers (i.e., all plants that are present in t − 1a n dt).18 Table 4
shows that mean labor and capital shortages are larger for the pre- than the post-
reform period. The fact that the absolute value of labor and capital shortages falls
substantially during the post-reform period suggests plants were closer to their desired
labor and capital levels after the reforms, consistent with greater ﬂexibility in factor
markets. In terms of second moments, dispersion of both labor and capital shortages
fell in the 1990s relative to the 1980s which is also broadly consistent with greater
ﬂexibility. Figures 1 and 2 also show the cross-section distributions of labor and
capital shortages for the entire period, while Figures 3.a and 4.a show the pre- and
inverse relationship between prices and measured TFP, and (ii) quite sensible estimates of demand
elasticities, suggest that ﬁrms do indeed face downward sloping demand curves.
17The elasticity of demand may diﬀer across sectors and time. However, the correlation between
our demand shock measures estimated allowing for a uniform elasticity and our demand shock
measures estimated allowing for diﬀerent elasticities during the pre- and post-reform period is 0.97.
While the demand shock measures diﬀer more when allowing elasticities to vary by sector, all of
our results below are robust to the use of demand shocks which take away sectoral diﬀerences in
elasticities. Results are available upon request.
18We report only results for the sample of pairwise continuers. Our framework can also acom-
modate entering and exiting businesses, but only in an accounting sense that does not contribute
much to the understanding of adjustment patterns. The problem in using this framework to study
adjustment costs for plants that exit is that one needs to assume that factor demands after the plant
has exited are zero. Since actual use of output is zero, the plant is shown as being perfectly able to
close all the gap, so that no adjustment costs are implied. A similar problem in the construction of
adjustment measures arises for entering businesses (since factor use in the year prior to entering is
zero). Hence, no interesting conclusions about adjustment costs when entering and exiting can be
drawn from this analysis. It is important to mention, however, that our results about the shapes of
adjustment functions are robust to the inclusion of entering and exiting businesses.
14post-reform distributions of labor and capital shortages, respectively.
5.1 Adjustment Functions
Table 5 and Figures 1 and 2 present estimates of the labor and capital parametric
adjustment functions using equations (5) and (6). The employment adjustment
function, A =
4ljt
Zjt , is depicted in Figure 1 as a function of the labor shortage, Z,
setting the capital shortage at X =0 ,X at one standard deviation, and X at minus
one standard deviation. Similarly, Figure 2 depicts the capital adjustment function,
B =
4kjt
Xjt , as a function of the capital shortage, X, setting the labor shortage at
Z =0 ,Z at one standard deviation, and Z at minus one standard deviation.
Consistent with the previous literature, Figures 1 and 2 show highly nonlinear
adjustment. Table 5 shows that the nonlinear terms are not only economically
but also statistically signiﬁcant. There are, however, striking asymmetries between
positive and negative adjustments. Figure 1 shows that labor faces nonlinearities
only when faced with employment shortages but not with surpluses. For example,
we ﬁnd that an increase of one standard deviation in employment shortages from the
mean increases the employment adjustment rate by close to 15%. By contrast, for
capital, we ﬁnd nonlinearities on both the creation and destruction sides. Figure 2
shows that plants with larger gaps between desired and actual capital adjust more.
For example, we ﬁnd that an increase of one standard deviation in the shortages from
the mean increases the adjustment rate for capital by about 20%. In addition, we
ﬁnd clear evidence of irreversibilities for capital on the destruction side as capital
shedding is much less likely than investment, even in the presence of large capital
surpluses.
Generally, our results are consistent with the ﬁndings in CEH (1995, 1997) who
also ﬁnd evidence of nonlinear adjustment for capital and employment separately.
Moreover, the ﬁnding of irreversibility in capital formation is consistent with the
evidence by Caballero and Engel (1999) and Cooper and Haltiwanger (2000) who
ﬁnd that both convex and non-convex costs of adjusting, as well as irreversibilities,
are all important components of capital adjustment cost functions.
Our speciﬁcations are more general than those in previous studies, as we consider
capital and employment adjustment jointly, so it is interesting to study the eﬀects of
capital shortages on employment adjustment and of employment shortages on capital
adjustment. Figure 1 shows that while higher capital shortages (e.g., increasing X
by one standard deviation) reduce the pace of job creation, they do not have a large
eﬀect on employment adjustment on the destruction side.19 On the other hand,
19The fact that capital shortages inhibit job creation is consistent with the ﬁnding by Caballero,
Engel and Micco (2004) that in Colombia, and other Latin American economies, large ﬁrms display
more pronounced nonlinearities in their propensityt oa d j u s te m p l o y m e n t ,w i th resulting substan-
tially lower probability of facing large labor shortages. Large producers in their sample are less likely
to face ﬁnancial constraints to invest and are therefore less likely to exhibit large capital shortages
15Figure 2 shows that greater labor shortages lead to less investment when capital is
below its desired level, while greater labor surpluses make ﬁr m sl e s sl i k e l yt os h e d
capital when it is excessive. In this respect, capital and labor frictions appear to be
dynamic complements as they reinforce each other (i.e., less adjustment in one factor
leads to less adjustment on the other and vice-versa).
Before proceeding to our analysis of the eﬀects of the reforms, it is important
to emphasize that taking a ﬂexible nonlinear approach towards estimation of the
adjustment dynamics is critical in this context. First, the adjustment of one factor
depends not on the gap between actual and desired levels of that factor, but also
on the gap of the other factor. Second, the shapes of the adjustment functions
are highly nonlinear with important asymmetries for positive and negative shortages
and important cross eﬀects. Thus, using our generalized approach is critical for
understanding the patterns of adjustment in general, and the impact of the reforms
in particular.
5.2 Adjustments after Deregulation
The reforms had a substantial impact on the patterns of labor and capital adjust-
ments. Figure 3.a shows substantially more employment adjustment on the destruc-
tion side after dismissal costs were reduced in 1990. In particular, we ﬁnd an increase
in the adjustment rate of about 10% for plants faced with employment surpluses after
the reforms. On the creation side, there is less adjustment for small shortages but
substantially more for shortages above a threshold, implying more important nonlin-
earities after the reforms. This is consistent with greater job creation in response to
labor shortages after credit constraints were relaxed and capital shortages reduced,
following ﬁnancial liberalization.20 In addition, the reduction in dismissal costs is
more likely to aﬀect hiring decisions when larger pools of workers are hired post-
reform and it becomes more diﬃcult to screen low quality applicants, who become a
liability if dismissal costs are high. For example, we ﬁnd a reduction in the adjustment
rate of about 5% for plants with shortages one standard deviation above the mean,
but an increase in the adjustment rate of more than 10% for plants with shortages
two standard deviations above the mean. Interestingly, after the reforms, the average
a d j u s t m e n tr a t ef o rd e s t r u c t i o ni sh i g h e rt h a nt h a tf o rc r e a t i o nb u tt h eo p p o s i t ei s
true pre-reform. Hence, there is evidence of irreversibilities in hiring only before the
reforms. The ﬁnding of greater labor market ﬂexibility is not surprising given that
the labor market reform of 1990 intended to eliminate distortions on dismissals and
hiring by reducing dismissal costs.
Figure 4.a shows less capital adjustment to eliminate excess capacity after the
too.
20Indeed, as Figure 1 illustrates, lower capital shortages are associated with more pronounced
nonlinearities in response to labor shortages.
16reforms, but no discernible change in investment in response to capital shortages.21
For example, we ﬁnd a reduction in the adjustment rate of capital of close to 10%
after the reforms for plants one standard deviation below the mean shortage.
There may be a number of factors behind the decline in capital adjustment. For
one, the greater ﬂexibility of labor may have induced some substitution away from
investment changes, as reforms reduced labor adjustment costs relative to capital
adjustment costs. After reforms, a given labor surplus generates greater job destruc-
tion than in the previous period, and the opposite is true for capital, suggesting that
capital adjustment has been substituted by employment adjustment. Also, greater
competition and uncertainty may have led to an increase in the option value of post-
poning investment projects. Indeed, as documented in Eslava et al. (2004), we ﬁnd
that productivity and demand shocks become much more volatile after the reforms,
reﬂecting greater uncertainty.22
Up to this point, we have discussed changes in the patterns of adjustment between
the pre- and the post-reform periods, and have attributed those changes to the reform
process. One valid question is whether the reforms are truly behind the observed
changes, or maybe other, contemporaneous, forces are at work. To try to get at this
question, we allow the adjustment function to vary with an index of overall reform for
the Colombian economy.23 The reform index, which varies yearly, measures the de-
gree of market orientation in the areas of labor regulation, ﬁnancial sector regulation,
trade openness, privatization and taxation. Our index of reform is generated using
the data on institutions collected by Lora (2001).24 Figure 5 presents the index,
which has an increasing trend over the period, with an important discrete increase at
the beginning of the 1990s.
The results, letting the adjustment functions vary with this measure of reform,
are illustrated in Figures 3.b and 4.b, which depict the adjustment function for three
21These results are, in general, robust to changes in the values of e Rt. The only diﬀerence emerges
when allowing e Rt to vary over time with changes of the ex-post real interest rate. In this case,
we obtain that the reduced ﬂexibility of capital is observed also for positive shortages (Xjt > 0),
although the eﬀect is more modest than on the destruction side. However, this result should be
considered with caution as it relies on ex-post measures of the real interest rate, which is an imperfect
proxy for the expected interest rate.
22In addition, access to new imported equipment due to trade liberalization may have depressed
the market for used capital thus widening the gap between the purchase and re-sale values of
equipment and reducing capital layoﬀs.
23In practice, we do this by interacting each term of the adjustment function with the reform
index, rather than the reform dummy. Since the series for the index starts only in 1985, when
including this index our estimations are restricted to the 1985-1998 period.
24Following Lora (2001), we generate indices of market reform in each of the ﬁve areas mentioned
above, and then average those individual indices to construct the index of overall reform. However,
Lora (2001) calculates the individual indices in a 0-1 scale, where 0 (1) corresponds to the most
(least) rigid institutions in Latin America over the period for each of the ﬁve categories that compose
the aggregate index. We use a diﬀerent 0-1 scale, where the index in each category is calculated
relative to the minimum and maximum level of reform in Colombia during the period, rather than
the minimum and maximum relative to neighboring countries as calculated in the Lora index.
17diﬀerent levels of reform. Consistent with our interpretation of the ﬁndings in Fig-
ures 3.a and 4.a, we ﬁnd that increased market orientation yields more employment
adjustment on the destruction side and more pronounced nonlinearity of employment
adjustment on the creation side. Similarly, greater movement towards reforms seems
to be associated with less capital shedding, but appears to have very little eﬀect on
capital formation. Reform, thus, is found to have eﬀects on the patterns of adjust-
ment in the same direction as the simple pre- and post-reform comparisons.25 In
addition, deregulation of factor markets impacted the nonlinear adjustments of labor
and capital in rich ways — that is, the deregulation did not yield simple shifts of the
adjustment functions but rather impacted positive and negative shortages diﬀerently,
linear and nonlinear terms diﬀerently and cross terms diﬀerently.
6 Factor Reallocation and Aggregate Productivity
In this section, we examine whether there were productivity gains associated with the
changes in labor and capital adjustments observed after the reforms. In particular,
we measure changes in aggregate productivity due to changes in reallocation from the
r e d u c t i o no rr e m o v a lo fl a b o ra n dc a p i t a lm arket frictions. We conduct this exercise
by using a cross-sectional decomposition methodology, ﬁrst introduced by Olley and
Pakes (1996). We quantify what part of aggregate productivity every year reﬂects
the productivity of the average plant, and what part captures the concentration of
activity in the more productive plants, by conducting the following decomposition of
aggregate TFP:
TFP t = TFPt +
J X
j=1
³
fjt − ft
´³
TFP jt − TFPt
´
,
where TFP t is the aggregate total factor productivity measure for a given 3-digit
manufacturing sector in year t. These aggregate measures correspond to weighted
averages of our plant-level TFP measures, where the weights are market shares (calcu-
lated as described below). The ﬁrst term of the decomposition, TFPt,i st h ea v e r a g e
25Having shown this, it is important to note that not all the time variation in the patterns of ad-
justment may be attributed to changes in regulations, as captured by the reform index. Adjustment
patterns may also change as a reﬂection of the existence of stochastic adjustment costs, or changes
of adjustment costs attributable to cyclical (possibly aggregate) shocks, rather than persistent in-
stitutional change. To check for this, we estimate adjustment functions year-to-year. Results
of this exercise (available upon request) show that market orientation as captured by the reform
index seems to largely account for changes in the shape of the adjustment functions, though it does
not capture all the shifts in levels. It is important to note that, despite the clear importance of
cyclical factors, the same general patterns described for the pre- and post-reform periods are evident
in the year-to-year adjustment functions. In particular, the post-1990 years are characterized by
a more pronounced nonlinearity of adjustment on the job creation side, more job destruction, and
less capital shedding.
18cross-sectional (unweighted) mean of total factor productivity across all plants in that
sector in year t. TFP jt is the total factor productivity measure of plant j at time t
estimated as described in Section 5, fjt is the share or fraction of plant j0s output
o u to fs e c t o r a lo u t p u ta tt h e3 - d i g i tl e v e li ny e a rt,a n dft is the cross-sectional un-
weighted mean of fjt for the sector.26 The second term in this decomposition allows us
to understand whether production is disproportionately located at high-productivity
plants, and examining this decomposition over time allows us to learn whether the
cross-sectional allocation of activity has changed in response to the market reforms.27
We estimate the actual decomposition of TFP and then we construct four counter-
factuals, which allow us to answer what would had been the cross-sectional allocation
had frictions in factor markets been removed altogether or, alternatively, reduced to
the post-reform levels. The decompositions only diﬀer from each other in the shares
used in the second term. The ﬁrst decomposition uses actual output shares. The
other decompositions use counterfactual output shares, where output is calculated
as:
b Yjt = c Kb α
jt
³
b LjtHjt
´b β
Eb γ
jtM
b φ
jt
b Vjt (12)
In each case, the levels of energy, hours, and materials are the observed ones, and the
b Vjt is the exponential of our TFP measure. The levels c Kjt and b Ljt, however, vary
across decompositions. For the second decomposition, c Kjt and b Ljt are the friction-
less levels of capital and labor.28 For the third decomposition, c Kjt and b Ljt are the
capital and employment levels that would had resulted if labor and capital changed
according to our estimated adjustment functions in equations (5) and (6), which vary
between the pre- and post-reform periods. Finally, for the last two decompositions,
we construct counter-factual shares where b Ljt and c Kjt are the employment and cap-
ital levels that would have prevailed if the labor and capital adjustment functions,
respectively, had remained the entire period as during the pre-reform years.
The results for these decompositions are presented in Table 6. The actual de-
composition, presented in the ﬁrst three columns, shows that aggregate productivity
26The fact that we calculate aggregate measures at the sector level means that our focus is on
within sector reallocation rather than between sector reallocation, for sectors deﬁned at the 3-digit
level. For measurement and conceptual reasons, comparisons of TFP across sectors (in levels) are
more problematic to interpret. Focusing on within sector allocation permits us to emphasize the
degree to which market reforms have led to an improved allocation of activity across businesses due
to less distortions in factor markets and the associated higher competition.
27An advantage of this cross-sectional method over methods that decompose changes in pro-
ductivity over time, is that cross-sectional diﬀerences in productivity are more persistent and less
dominated by measurement error or transitory shocks.
28For all counterfactuals, we estimate the levels of capital and labor, and thus their respective
adjustments, holding the demand shocks at their average level for each plant. We do this in order to
hold constant any potential independent eﬀect of demand changes on reallocation during the period
of reforms. We have also conducted the counterfactuals allowing demand shocks to vary and the
results are very similar, suggesting that demand changes, on their own, do not play a crucial role in
reallocating activity from low- towards high-productivity plants.
19grew after the introduction of reforms in 1991. Moreover, Column (3) shows that
much of the increase in aggregate productivity over this time is associated with an
increase in allocative eﬃciency.
The next three columns present the frictionless decomposition, which shows how
productivity levels would have changed had all frictions in factor adjustment been
removed. Comparing Columns (1) and (4) shows that productivity would had been
higher in all years had all frictions from factor markets been removed. In addi-
tion, the second term from this counter-factual frictionless decomposition reported
in Column (6) suggests that a large part of the gains from the removal of frictions
would come from the fact that allowing plants to adjust labor and capital more eas-
ily increases the market share of more productive plants and reduces the share of
less productive plants. In particular, comparing Columns (3) and (6) shows that
the covariation between market share and productivity increases substantially in the
frictionless environment compared to the actual environment.
The next decompositions, reported in Columns (7)-(15), allow answering whether
the Colombian labor and capital reforms moved the economy in the direction of a
frictionless environment. For these comparisons, we focus on the cross term since
that is the only term that is impacted by these exercises. Columns (3) and (9) show
that the actual and predicted increases in the cross term are about the same and
yield an increase in the cross term of almost 17 log points from 1982 to 1998.29 This
compares with an increase in the cross term from the frictionless case of about 25
log points. Thus, allocative eﬃciency increased signiﬁcantly following the reforms
but not by as much as it would have in a frictionless environment. Note that some
adjustment impediments have technological, rather than institutional, origins. Even
if deregulation would have removed all distortions to factor markets, some factor
adjustment frictions would remain.
Columns (10)-(15) show what would had been the impact of reallocation on pro-
ductivity had the labor and capital market reforms not taken place in 1991. We ﬁrst
keep the employment adjustment function as during the pre-reform period but allow
the capital adjustment function to change, and we then keep the capital adjustment
function as during the pre-reform period but allow the labor adjustment function to
change. The cross term is uniformly lower in Column (12) compared to Column (9),
reﬂecting the cost of decreased capital ﬂexibility. However, the diﬀerences are very
small.
By contrast, the results for the last decomposition in Columns (13)-(15) indicate
that productivity and the cross-section term are bigger when only labor adjustment is
allowed to change after the reforms compared to when both labor and capital are al-
lowed to change. Our results, thus, suggest that the labor market reform contributed
29The ﬁnding that these columns yield roughly the same result is a speciﬁcation check on our
model. That is, Column (3) reﬂects the actual cross term and Column (9) reﬂects the cross term
from using the outputs implied by measures of factor inputs derived from our model. The model is
successful in terms of generating the actual pattern of covariation between output shares and TFP.
20to increase productivity by reallocating activity from low- towards high-productivity
plants as labor adjustments moved closer to their desired levels. At the same time,
the results suggest that even after the reforms, Colombian labor and capital markets,
especially the latter, are still subject to many restrictions that inhibit the economy
from reallocating resources and from fully beneﬁtting from productivity enhancing
reallocation.
7C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we examine how plant-level adjustment dynamics for capital and labor
interact with each other. Given the widespread ﬁnding that plant-level adjustments
are lumpy, we allow for nonlinear adjustment dynamics. Beyond considering the
interaction of capital and labor adjustments, we estimate adjustment dynamics in the
context of an emerging economy, namely Colombia, that has undergone a substantial
reform process intended to deregulate factor markets. In particular, an important
objective of structural reforms in Colombia and other developing economies during
the 1990s was to make factor markets more ﬂexible.
Our results can be brieﬂy summarized as follows. First, consistent with the ex-
isting literature, we ﬁnd strong evidence of nonlinear micro adjustment. Businesses
are likely to adjust capital and labor by a proportionally greater amount if the gaps
between desired and actual levels are large. Second, we ﬁnd important interactions
between capital and labor adjustments. In particular, businesses with capital short-
ages are less likely to create jobs in response to labor shortages, and businesses with
labor shortages are less likely to invest as a result of capital shortages. Similarly,
businesses with excess labor are less likely to shed capital when ﬁxed assets are in
surplus. These ﬁndings highlight the importance of jointly analyzing capital and
labor adjustments. In terms of policy, the evidence highlights an undesirable feature
of piecemeal reform, namely that frictions in still regulated factor markets can distort
adjustment of a newly deregulated factor, thus hampering the eﬀectiveness of reform.
In terms of the impact of deregulation, the most dramatic eﬀect we ﬁnd is that
the labor market reform, which reduced dismissal costs substantially, increased the
ﬂexibility of labor especially on the destruction side. Interestingly, this increase
in labor ﬂexibility is accompanied by a milder but signiﬁcant reduction in capital
variability, especially on the capital shedding side. Thus, while the reforms may
have succeeded in making labor more ﬂexible in Colombia, plants appear to have
used that greater ﬂexibility of labor to reduce capital adjustments. The reductions
in irreversibilities and adjustment costs associated with institutions may increase the
importance of technology-related frictions. Generally, these latter frictions associated
with labor rotation are smaller than those associated with retooling or scrapping in
the case of capital. In the absence of distortions, producers would rather respond to
shocks through the adjustment of labor, as the more variable factor, as opposed to
through the adjustment of ﬁxed capital.
21If factor reallocation facilitates the expansion of more eﬃcient incumbents and the
contraction of less eﬃcient plants, then we may expect factor market deregulation to
be associated with productivity growth. We, thus, explore whether the changes in
employment and capital adjustments after the Colombian reforms were productivity
enhancing and whether the hypothetical move to a completely frictionless world in
factor markets would be productivity enhancing. We ﬁnd that moving towards fric-
tionless factor adjustment would indeed increase productivity substantially, mainly
by allowing to move activity from low- towards high-productivity plants. At the same
time, we ﬁnd that, while the reforms themselves seemed to have moved the economy
towards an environment with less frictions in factor markets, productivity remains
well below the frictionless levels after reforms. These results suggest that Colom-
bian labor and, especially, capital markets are still subject to many restrictions that
inhibit the resource reallocation process and prevent the realization of all potential
gains from productivity enhancing reallocation. Although some of the remaining ad-
justment frictions may be the result of technological impediments (e.g. labor training
or capital installation costs), other factor market frictions may be removed by deeper
deregulation.
It is important to note that while our result ss u g g e s tt h a tt h er e f o r m s ,a n dm a i n l y
the labor market reform, generated eﬃciency gains, the much greater adjustment in
response to labor surpluses after the reforms probably also generated important losses
associated with worker displacement that would need to be quantiﬁed in order to
assess the welfare eﬀects of the reforms.
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27Appendix
The ﬁrst-order conditions for capital, employment, hours, energy and materials
yield the following system of equations:
f Kjt =
ζ +
³
η
η−1
´h
e Rt − lnα
i
− e Vjt − β
µ
e Ljt + f Hjt
¶
− γ e Ejt − φf Mjt
h
α −
³
η
η−1
´i , (13)
e Ljt =
ζ + ξ +
³
η
η−1
´
ln(1 + w1tH
δ
jt) − e Vjt − αf Kjt − βf Hjt − γ e Ejt − φf Mjt
h
β −
³
η
η−1
´i (14)
f Hjt =
ζ + ξ +
³
η
η−1
´
[ e w1t − e Ljt]+l nδ − e Vjt − αf Kjt − βe Ljt − γ e Ejt − φf Mjt
h
β −
³
δη
η−1
´i , (15)
e Ejt =
ζ +
³
η
η−1
´h
e PEt − lnγ
i
− e Vjt − αf Kjt − β
µ
e Ljt + f Hjt
¶
− φf Mjt
h
γ −
³
η
η−1
´i , (16)
f Mjt =
ζ +
³
η
η−1
´h
e PMt− lnφ
i
− e Vjt − αf Kjt − β
µ
e Ljt + f Hjt
¶
− γ e Ejt
h
φ −
³
η
η−1
´i , (17)
where e Ljt, f Kjt, f Hjt, e Ejt,a n df Mjt are the logs of Ljt, Kjt, Hjt, Ejt,a n dMjt,
respectively. Also, ζ =
³
η
η−1
´h
ln
³
η
η−1
´
− f Djt
i
and ξ =
³
η
η−1
´
[ e w0t − lnβ]. Given
our assumption of no adjustment costs for the use of hours, energy, and materials,
f Hjt, e Ejt,a n df Mjt are equal to their observed values. Therefore, the system is reduced
to two equations and two unknowns: e Ljt and f Kjt. These equations, captured by (9),
are expressed in terms of the parameters of the model, wages, interest rates, energy
and materials prices, unobservable productivity and demand shocks, and the use of
other factors: f Hjt, e Ejt,a n df Mjt.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, Before and After Reforms 
  
Variable Pre-Reforms  Post-Reforms 
 
Output 10.49 
(1.67) 
10.90 
(1.88) 
Capital 8.21 
(2.05) 
8.75 
(2.18) 
Labor 10.97 
(1.1) 
10.95 
(1.25) 
Energy 11.30 
(1.88) 
11.55 
(1.99) 
Materials 9.61 
(1.85) 
10.25 
(1.88) 
Output Prices  -0.08 
(0.44) 
-0.15 
(0.74) 
Energy Prices  0.25 
(0.50) 
0.55 
(0.43) 
Material 
Prices 
0.02 
(0.35) 
-0.10 
(0.57) 
Wages 193 
  (54.05)        
229.56 
(76.05)        
     
Entry Rate  0.0981  0.0843 
Exit Rate  0.0873  0.1069 
     
N 55,298  44,816 
    
      
 
Notes:  This table reports means and standard deviations of the log of quantities and of 
prices deviated from yearly producer price indices.  It also reports means and 
deviations of yearly wages in thousands of pesos of 1982.  The entry and exit rates are 
the number of entrants divided by total plants and number of exiting plants divided by 
total number of plants.  The pre-reform period includes the years 1982-90 and the post-
reform period includes the years 1991-98.  
 
Table 2: Production Function Equations 
 
   
Production 
Function 
OLS 
 
(1) 
 
Production 
Function 
2SLS 
 
(2) 
 
First Stage 
Partial  
R- square  
 
(3) 
      
Capital 0.0764 
(0.0025) 
0.3027 
(0.0225) 
0.128 
Labor Hours  0.2393 
(0.0037) 
0.2126    
(0.0313) 
0.139 
Energy 0.124 
(0.0028) 
0.1758    
(0.0143) 
0.231 
Materials 0.5891 
(0.0026) 
0.2752    
(0.0095) 
0.324 
      
Root Mean Squared 
Error 
0.6545 0.7670 
 
N 48,114  48,114   
          
 
Notes:  Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  The regression uses physical 
output as the dependent variable, and capital, employment hours, energy, and materials 
as regressors, where all variables are in logs.  The following variables are used to 
instrument the inputs:  Shea’s (1993) downstream demand instruments constructed as 
the demand for the intermediate output (calculated using the input-output matrix); one- 
and two-period lags of downstream demand; regional government expenditures, 
excluding government investment; and energy and material plant-level prices, deviated 
from the yearly PPI.  The first stage R² reports the square of the sample correlation 
coefficient between Ijt and Îjt, where I=K,L,E,M and Îjt are the predicted values of the 
inputs from a regression of Ijt on the instruments.  The partial R² reports the sample 
correlation coefficient between sjt and ŝjt, where sjt are the residuals from a regression 
of Ijt on all other inputs I1jt and ŝjt are the correlations between Îjt and the predicted 
values of all other inputs Î1jt. 
 
  
 
Table 3: Inverse Demand Equations 
 
Regressor 
 
Inverse-
Demand 
OLS 
 
(1) 
 
Inverse-
Demand 
2SLS 
 
(2) 
 
 
First Stage 
 R-square 
 
(3) 
 
Physical Output  -0.0905 
(0.0011) 
-0.4381 
(0.0034) 
0.2177 
     
Root Mean 
Squared 
Error 
0.5543 0.8267  - 
N  86,251 86,251 86,251 
          
 
Notes:  Standard Errors are in parentheses.  The dependent variable is the 
plant-level price minus the yearly PPI (all in logs).  The two-stage least 
squares regression instruments physical output with the 2SLS TFP measure 
estimated using Column (2) in Table 2.  The R-squared reports the square of 
the correlation between Yjt and Ŷjt, where Ŷjt is the predicted value of output 
from a regression of Yjt on the instruments.   
 
  
 
Table 4: Moments of Labor and Capital Shortages, 
Before and After Reforms 
 
  Labor Shortages    Capital Shortages 
 
    Pre-Reforms    Post-Reforms    Pre-Reforms    Post-Reforms 
 
Mean  0.0391         -0.0086    0.1628    -0.0388 
         
Standard  Deviation  0.6521  0.6328  0.8103  0.8012 
            
N  38,719    34,288   37,918   33,811 
              
 
Notes:  The table reports the first four  moments of labor and capital shortages estimated using equations (1) and (2).  The pre-reform period 
includes the years 1982-1990, while the post-reform period includes the years 1991-1998.  
 
Table 5: Labor and Capital Parametric Adjustment Functions 
 
  Labor Adjustment  Capital Adjustment 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
       
Constant 0.218 
(0.006) 
0.184 
(0.008) 
0.024 
(0.007) 
0.063 
(0.010) 
Pos. Shortage  -0.071 
(0.010) 
-0.012 
(0.012) 
0.190 
(0.012) 
0.158 
(0.014) 
L Shortage²  -0.009 
(0.003) 
-0.009 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
L Shortage²  
× Pos. Shortage 
0.056 
(0.005) 
0.029 
(0.006) 
-0.008 
(0.005) 
-0.008 
(0.008) 
K Shortage²  -0.010 
(0.003) 
-0.009 
(0.004) 
0.042 
(0.003) 
0.040 
(0.005) 
K Shortage² 
× Pos. Shortage 
0.015 
(0.004) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
L Shortage 
× K Shortage 
0.005 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.054 
(0.004) 
-0.060 
(0.006) 
L Shortage 
× K Sh. × Pos. Sh
-0.053 
(0.004) 
-0.031 
(0.007) 
-0.029 
(0.005) 
-0.015 
(0.007) 
Post-reform - 
 
0.065 
(0.009) 
- -0.072 
(0.011) 
Pos. Shortage 
× Post-reform 
- -0.113 
(0.013) 
- 0.056 
(0.015) 
L Shortage²  
× Post-reform 
- 0.006 
(0.005) 
- 0.010 
(0.008) 
L Shortage²  
× Pos. Sh. × Post 
- 0.041 
(0.007) 
- 0.013 
(0.011) 
K Shortage²  
× Post-reform 
- 0.000 
(0.005) 
- 0.010 
(0.006) 
K Shortage²  
× Pos. Sh. × Post 
- 0.009 
(0.008) 
- -0.002 
(0.007) 
L Shortage 
× K Sh. × Post 
- -0.002 
(0.005) 
- 0.008 
(0.007) 
L Sh. × K Sh. 
× Pos. Sh. × Post 
- -0.016 
(0.008) 
- -0.036 
(0.009) 
        
N 70,299  70,299  70,299  70,299 
        
 
Notes:  The table reports parametric adjustment functions estimated using equations (5) and (6).  The labor shortage is estimated using 
equation (1) and the capital shortage using equation (2).  The sample is a panel of pairwise continuining plants.  The positive shortage 
dummy takes the value of 1 when there is a labor or capital shortage and the value of 0 when there is a labor or capital surplus.  The 
post-reform dummy takes the value of 1 for plants observed during the years 1991-98 and the the value of 0 for plants observed during 
the years 1983-90. Table 6: Cross-Section Decomposition of Three-Digit Level TFP, 1982-1998 
  
     
Shares calculated with actual 
output    Shares calculated with 
frictionless output 
Shares calculated with 
counterfactual output: both 
capital and labor 
adjustments vary pre- and  
post-reform 
 
Shares calculated with 
counterfactual output: only 
capital adjustment varies 
post-reform. 
Shares calculated with 
counterfactual output: only 
labor adjustment varies post-
reform. 
 
Year  Aggregate 
(Weighted) 
Simple 
Average 
Cross-
term 
 Aggregate 
(Weighted
) 
Simple 
Average
Cross-
term 
Aggregate 
(Weighted
) 
Simple 
Average
Cross-
term 
 Aggregate 
(Weighted
) 
Simple 
Average
Cross-
term 
Aggregate 
(Weighted
) 
Simple 
Average
Cross-
term 
   (1)  (2) (3)   (4)  (5) (6)  (7)  (8) (9)    (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14) (15) 
1983   1.3560 0.9695  0.3865    1.6148 0.9695  0.6453 1.3766 0.9695  0.4070   1.3766 0.9695  0.4070 1.3766 0.9695  0.4070 
1984   1.3175 0.9878  0.3297    1.5201 0.9878  0.5322 1.3392 0.9878  0.3513   1.3392 0.9878  0.3513 1.3392 0.9878  0.3513 
1985   1.3896 1.0446  0.3450    1.5976 1.0446  0.5529 1.4019 1.0446  0.3572   1.4019 1.0446  0.3572 1.4019 1.0446  0.3572 
1986   1.4066 1.1015  0.3051    1.5959 1.1015  0.4943 1.4152 1.1015  0.3137   1.4152 1.1015  0.3137 1.4152 1.1015  0.3137 
1987   1.4262 1.1126  0.3136    1.5915 1.1126  0.4789 1.4286 1.1126  0.3160   1.4286 1.1126  0.3160 1.4286 1.1126  0.3160 
1988   1.4702 1.1689  0.3013    1.6455 1.1689  0.4765 1.4792 1.1689  0.3103   1.4792 1.1689  0.3103 1.4792 1.1689  0.3103 
1989   1.4478 1.1636  0.2842    1.6132 1.1636  0.4496 1.4540 1.1636  0.2904   1.4540 1.1636  0.2904 1.4540 1.1636  0.2904 
1990   1.4994 1.1415  0.3580    1.6919 1.1415  0.5505 1.5051 1.1415  0.3637   1.5051 1.1415  0.3637 1.5051 1.1415  0.3637 
1991   1.5266 1.1601  0.3665    1.7089 1.1601  0.5487 1.5329 1.1601  0.3728   1.5323 1.1601  0.3722 1.5336 1.1601  0.3735 
1992   1.5105 1.0738  0.4368    1.7579 1.0738  0.6841 1.5201 1.0738  0.4464   1.5185 1.0738  0.4448 1.5210 1.0738  0.4473 
1993   1.4779 1.1042  0.3737    1.6658 1.1042  0.5616 1.4856 1.1042  0.3814   1.4851 1.1042  0.3808 1.4865 1.1042  0.3823 
1994   1.5135 1.0812  0.4323    1.7192 1.0812  0.6381 1.5194 1.0812  0.4382   1.5187 1.0812  0.4375 1.5201 1.0812  0.4389 
1995   1.5168 1.0346  0.4822    1.7149 1.0346  0.6803 1.5294 1.0346  0.4948   1.5287 1.0346  0.4941 1.5302 1.0346  0.4956 
1996   1.5768 1.0065  0.5703    1.8209 1.0065  0.8145 1.5952 1.0065  0.5888   1.5942 1.0065  0.5878 1.5964 1.0065  0.5899 
1997   1.5941 1.0594  0.5348    1.8327 1.0594  0.7733 1.6148 1.0594  0.5554   1.6142 1.0594  0.5549 1.6163 1.0594  0.5569 
1998   1.6209 1.0873  0.5336    1.8596 1.0873  0.7722 1.6349 1.0873  0.5476   1.6339 1.0873  0.5466 1.6367 1.0873  0.5494 
                                   
 
Notes:  All figures are simple means of 3-digit sector level statistics.  The sample has been restricted to plants for which counterfactual output in Columns (7) through (15) can be calculated.  The first column of 
each group shows the weighted mean of TFP, where market shares are the weights.  Market share is the contribution of each plant to output (or counterfactual output calculated as in equation (12))  of its 3-digit 
sector.  The second column of each group shows the contribution of the simple means of TFP.  The third column of each group shows the contribution of the cross-sectional correlation between market share and 
TFP.   Shares in Columns (7)-(9) are obtained by allowing both capital and labor adjustment functions to change after reforms.  Shares in Columns (10)-(12) are obtained by allowing only the capital adjustment 
function to change after reforms.   Shares in Columns (13)-(15)  are obtained by allowing only the labor adjustment function to change after reforms. Figure 1: Estimated Employment Adjustment Function and Distribution of Employment Shortages
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Figure 2.: Estimated Capital Adjustment Function and Distribution of Capital Shortages
-0,1
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
-1,95 -1,75 -1,55 -1,35 -1,15 -0,95 -0,75 -0,55 -0,35 -0,15 0 0,15 0,35 0,55 0,75 0,95 1,15 1,35 1,55 1,75 1,95
x
B
(
z
,
x
)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
f
(
x
)
 
d
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
(
%
)
B(z=0 ,x) B(z=0.64 ,x) B(z= -0.64 ,x) f(x)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 3.a.: Estimated Employment Adjustment Function and Distribution of Employment Shortages,
Pre- and Post-Reform (x=0)
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Figure 3.b.: Estimated Employment Adjustment Function at Different Levels of Reform Index (x=0)
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 Figure 4.a.: Estimated Capital Adjustment Function and Distribution of Capital Shortages,
Pre- and Post-Reform (z=0)
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Figure 4.b.: Estimated Capital Adjustment Function at Different Levels of Reform Index (z=0)
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Figure 5.: Re-scaled Reform Index for Colombia, 1985-1998
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